Kaja Kallas Urges Kosovo and Serbia to Implement the Ohrid agreement and Advance Normalisation
The EU’s foreign-policy chief tells Albin Kurti and Aleksandar Vučić that normalisation and European integration must advance together, insisting that existing agreements are binding and that Brussels cannot substitute for political will in Pristina and Belgrade.
European Union foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas renewed pressure on Kosovo and Serbia in September 2026 to make concrete progress toward normalising their relations. After separate meetings with Kosovo Prime Minister Albin Kurti and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić in New York, she called for renewed implementation (zbatim) of agreements already reached through the EU-facilitated dialogue. Kallas emphasised that progress toward normalisation and progress toward the European Union must proceed in parallel (paralelisht). Her message represented another attempt to overcome the prolonged diplomatic stagnation (ngecje) that has affected the dialogue between Pristina and Belgrade.
The meetings took place during the high-level week of the 81st United Nations General Assembly in New York. Kallas used the diplomatic gathering to underline the binding (detyrues) character of the agreements negotiated under EU mediation. She specifically highlighted the 2023 Agreement on the Path to Normalisation and its Ohrid implementation annex (aneks zbatimi). Her conclusion was deliberately direct: political leaders could no longer rely indefinitely on diplomatic ambiguity (paqartësi) while postponing implementation.
Kallas argued that fulfilling the existing agreements should not be understood as doing a favour for European institutions. She described implementation as an obligation (detyrim) owed primarily to the citizens of Kosovo and Serbia. The wider Western Balkans, she added, also has an interest in greater regional stability (stabilitet) and predictable relations between Belgrade and Pristina. This framing shifted attention from Brussels itself toward the practical consequences (pasoja) of unresolved relations for people living in the region.
The European Union continues to present itself as an impartial facilitator rather than a party capable of imposing a final settlement. Kallas stressed that European mediation (ndërmjetësim) can provide proposals, institutional support and diplomatic pressure. It cannot, however, replace the domestic political will (vullnet) required from leaders in Kosovo and Serbia. Her warning underscored the limitations of external facilitation (lehtësim diplomatik) when the two sides remain reluctant to carry out politically sensitive commitments.
The most important framework remains the Agreement on the Path to Normalisation reached in Brussels in February 2023. Under that agreement, both sides accepted principles concerning peaceful coexistence (bashkëjetesë) and respect for each other’s institutional autonomy. Serbia also committed not to oppose Kosovo’s membership in international organisations (organizata) under Article 4. The agreement simultaneously established the principle of mutual non-obstruction (pengim) of each side’s European path.
The agreement does not amount to Serbia’s formal recognition of Kosovo as an independent state. It nevertheless requires both parties to operate with greater practical normalisation (normalizim) and to refrain from representing each other internationally. The text also calls for deeper bilateral cooperation (bashkëpunim) in fields including transport, health, science, technology, law enforcement and environmental protection. These obligations create a framework for gradual rapprochement (afrim) even while the final status dispute remains politically unresolved.
The Ohrid Implementation Annex, agreed in March 2023, added specific mechanisms intended to convert broad principles into action. One requirement calls for appropriate self-management (vetëmenaxhim) arrangements for Kosovo’s Serbian community under previous dialogue commitments. Another created a joint EU-chaired monitoring committee (komitet monitorues) responsible for following implementation of the agreement. The annex also established explicit conditionality (kushtëzim) by linking non-compliance with possible negative consequences for EU integration and European financial support.
The issue of Kosovo Serb self-management remains one of the most controversial elements of the entire dialogue. Serbia continues to insist on establishment of the Association or Community of Serb-majority municipalities as a central commitment (angazhim) deriving from earlier Brussels agreements. Vučić again raised this demand during his September meeting with Kallas, emphasising its implementation (zbatim) as a Serbian priority. For Belgrade, the issue has become a principal measure of Kosovo’s compliance (përputhshmëri) with agreements signed during more than a decade of dialogue.
Kosovo’s authorities, meanwhile, have repeatedly expressed concern about how such an association would operate within the country’s constitutional system. Pristina argues that any arrangement must remain compatible with Kosovo’s sovereignty (sovranitet) and constitutional order. Kosovo officials have resisted models they believe could create excessive institutional autonomy (autonomi) or a parallel political structure controlled from Belgrade. The continuing dispute illustrates the difficult constitutional balancing (balancim kushtetues) required to protect minority rights without producing competing centres of authority.
Kurti used his meeting with Kallas to emphasise a different security issue: the September 2023 armed attack at Banjska in northern Kosovo. He again demanded accountability (llogaridhënie) for Milan Radoičić and other suspects whom Kosovo accuses of involvement. Kurti asked the EU to exert greater pressure (trysni) on Serbia so the suspects could face justice in Kosovo. The issue remains a major source of distrust (mosbesim) in Pristina’s relationship with Belgrade.
The Banjska attack occurred when an armed group confronted Kosovo Police in the municipality of Zvečan, killing police sergeant Afrim Bunjaku. Kosovo has described the incident as a major security breach (shkelje sigurie) and a paramilitary attack supported by networks operating from Serbia. Radoičić publicly accepted responsibility for organising the group, intensifying demands for his extradition (ekstradim) to Kosovo. The continuing absence of a judicial resolution (zgjidhje) has made Banjska one of the most politically sensitive obstacles to renewed trust.
Belgrade has approached the dialogue from a substantially different security and political perspective. Vučić repeatedly highlights the position and security (siguri) of Serbs living in Kosovo, particularly in northern municipalities. Serbian officials argue that earlier dialogue commitments (angazhime) protecting the Serbian community have not been fully honoured. This disagreement over which obligations should receive priority has contributed to chronic diplomatic sequencing disputes (mosmarrëveshje për renditjen) in which each side demands action from the other before taking its own next step.
Kallas’s central response is that the agreements must be treated as a package rather than as a menu from which governments select only convenient provisions. The Ohrid Annex explicitly states that obligations should be implemented independently (në mënyrë të pavarur) of one another. Neither side is supposed to block implementation of another provision through political preconditions (parakushte). This principle is intended to prevent endless diplomatic reciprocity traps (kurthe reciprociteti) in which both governments justify inaction by pointing to the other side’s failures.
The European Union has increasingly connected implementation with both Kosovo’s and Serbia’s European ambitions. Normalisation is treated as a fundamental prerequisite (parakusht) for long-term progress toward EU membership. European leaders argue that unresolved territorial and political disputes cannot simply be imported (importohen) into the Union after accession. The dialogue therefore functions as an important form of conditionality (kushtëzim) shaping both countries’ relations with Brussels.
Serbia is formally further advanced in the accession process because it has held EU candidate status and negotiated membership chapters for years. Yet Brussels has repeatedly stated that genuine normalisation (normalizim) with Kosovo is fundamental to Serbia’s European future. Serbia must also demonstrate progress on domestic reforms (reforma) concerning democratic institutions, media freedom and the rule of law. Failure on either track can slow further accession (anëtarësim) progress.
Kosovo’s relationship with the EU is institutionally different because five EU member states still do not recognise its independence. Despite this constraint, European institutions continue to offer substantial financial and political integration (integrim) through the Stabilisation and Association framework and the Western Balkans Growth Plan. Continued normalisation can improve Kosovo’s diplomatic credibility (besueshmëri) within this process. Failure to implement dialogue obligations can instead create additional obstacles (pengesa) in relations with member states already cautious about Kosovo’s status.
The dialogue has struggled to generate sustained political momentum since the Ohrid agreement was reached. The European Union continues to seek renewed engagement (angazhim) after years marked by crises in northern Kosovo and disagreements about implementation. Peter Sørensen now serves as the EU Special Representative specifically responsible for the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue (Dialog). His mandate is to pursue comprehensive normalisation (normalizim) and ultimately a legally binding agreement addressing unresolved issues between the parties.
Sørensen participated in the September discussions surrounding Kallas’s New York meetings, underscoring the EU’s effort to connect high-level political pressure with the specialised dialogue process. His work focuses on identifying practical steps (hapa) capable of restarting substantive negotiations. The challenge is developing enough confidence-building (ndërtim besimi) to move from public accusations toward implementable agreements. Without such progress, repeated diplomatic meetings risk becoming largely symbolic (simbolike) rather than producing changes on the ground.
Kallas had already made clear that she considers the Ohrid agreement still valid despite arguments about its lack of formal signatures. She described the agreement as being in effect (fuqi) and requiring compliance from both parties. She also connected further lifting of EU measures against Kosovo with de-escalation (çtensionim) in the north. Her position demonstrates the EU’s reliance on both political incentives (stimuj) and pressure when attempting to influence behaviour.
The gradual lifting of measures imposed on Kosovo after northern tensions illustrates how the EU can connect political behaviour with practical consequences. Economic projects, financial assistance and diplomatic cooperation can operate as leverage (fuqi ndikuese) for Brussels. Kosovo’s access to these benefits can depend partly on maintaining stability and avoiding unilateral escalation. Such conditionality gives the EU considerable influence (ndikim) but can also generate resentment when Kosovo officials believe Serbia is not being subjected to equivalent pressure.
The EU repeatedly insists that it remains an even-handed mediator despite these accusations from both sides. Maintaining perceived impartiality (paanshmëri) is essential because neither Kosovo nor Serbia will cooperate effectively with a process they believe structurally favours the other. Brussels must therefore preserve sufficient political equidistance (baraslargësi) while still identifying failures to implement agreed commitments. This creates an unusually difficult diplomatic balancing act (balancim diplomatik) whenever one side demands stronger sanctions against the other.
Normalisation also has economic importance beyond the formal EU accession process. Better relations could improve cross-border commerce (tregti) and transport throughout the Western Balkans. Reduced political uncertainty can encourage greater foreign investment (investim) and allow infrastructure projects to operate with fewer security concerns. The resulting economic dividend (përfitim ekonomik) could be particularly important for communities near disputed or politically sensitive areas.
Ordinary citizens also experience practical consequences from unresolved relations. Questions involving documents, vehicle registrations, border crossings and public services can create everyday administrative friction (pengesa administrative). Dialogue agreements have frequently attempted to develop practical arrangements (zgjidhje praktike) even when leaders remain unable to resolve the larger political dispute. Successful normalisation would therefore involve incremental functionality (funksionalitet) as well as major diplomatic agreements.
The Serbian community in Kosovo remains central to this practical dimension. Reliable access to healthcare, education and local services requires sustainable institutional arrangements (rregullime institucionale) accepted by both Kosovo authorities and local residents. Kosovo has increasingly discussed integrating Serbia-supported institutions into its own legal framework (kuadër ligjor). The challenge is avoiding abrupt changes that produce social dislocation (çrregullim social) while ensuring that public institutions ultimately operate according to Kosovo law.
Missing persons from the 1998–1999 conflict provide another deeply human component of the dialogue. The Ohrid implementation framework requires urgent implementation of the Declaration on Missing Persons and continuing cooperation (bashkëpunim) in locating those still unaccounted for. Families need access to archives, burial-site information and forensic evidence (prova) regardless of continuing political disagreements. Progress in this field could provide an important humanitarian confidence-building measure (masë për ndërtimin e besimit) between societies still carrying the trauma of war.
The normalisation process also has a wider regional security dimension because instability between Kosovo and Serbia affects NATO, neighbouring states and the European Union. Repeated crises in the north can require greater international deployment (dislokim) and heightened military readiness through KFOR. Diplomatic failure can therefore produce direct security externalities (pasoja të jashtme) for countries not formally involved in the dispute. A durable settlement would reduce this regional vulnerability (cenueshmëri) and allow political attention to shift toward economic development and European integration.
Kallas’s September message was consequently designed to restore a sense of urgency after years of incomplete implementation. She insisted that the current stalemate (ngërç) cannot remain an acceptable permanent condition. Political leaders need to move from rhetorical commitment toward measurable deliverables (rezultate konkrete). The EU’s patience with recurring delays appears increasingly connected with demands for greater reciprocal accountability (llogaridhënie e ndërsjellë) from both governments.
The phrase “it is time to move forward” condensed this message into a deliberately simple political instruction. Kallas is attempting to create renewed momentum (vrull) without reopening every provision already negotiated. Brussels considers the existing agreements a sufficient foundation (themel) for progress if political leaders implement them in good faith. The principal missing element is therefore not another diplomatic blueprint (plan) but sustained political willingness to carry out commitments already made.
The next phase will test whether international pressure can overcome the incompatible priorities presented by Kurti and Vučić in New York. Kosovo continues to demand greater Serbian accountability (llogaridhënie) for Banjska and protection of its sovereignty. Serbia continues to prioritise the Community of Serb Municipalities and stronger institutional guarantees (garanci) for Kosovo Serbs. Kallas’s challenge is to turn those competing demands into parallel implementation (zbatim) rather than another reason for the dialogue to remain frozen.
Ultimately, the EU’s argument is that neither Kosovo nor Serbia can fully realise its European ambitions while their relationship remains unresolved. Normalisation is therefore not presented simply as a diplomatic compromise (kompromis) imposed from outside. Brussels regards it as a strategic investment (investim) in security, economic development and the European future of both societies. Whether the Ohrid Agreement becomes a genuine turning point (pikë kthese) will depend on implementation rather than on the number of meetings or declarations held under EU mediation.
Key Albanian Vocabulary
zbatim implementation
paralelisht parallel
ngecje stagnation
detyrues binding
aneks zbatimi implementation annex
paqartësi ambiguity
detyrim obligation
stabilitet stability
pasoja consequences
ndërmjetësim mediation
vullnet will
lehtësim diplomatik facilitation
bashkëjetesë coexistence
organizata organisations
pengim obstruction
normalizim normalisation
bashkëpunim cooperation
afrim rapprochement
vetëmenaxhim self-management
komitet monitorues monitoring committee
kushtëzim conditionality
angazhim commitment
përputhshmëri compliance
sovranitet sovereignty
autonomi autonomy
balancim kushtetues constitutional balancing
llogaridhënie accountability
trysni pressure
mosbesim distrust
shkelje sigurie security breach
ekstradim extradition
zgjidhje resolution
siguri security
angazhime commitments
mosmarrëveshje për renditjen sequencing disputes
në mënyrë të pavarur independently
parakushte preconditions
kurthe reciprociteti reciprocity traps
parakusht prerequisite
importohen imported
reforma reforms
anëtarësim accession
integrim integration
besueshmëri credibility
pengesa obstacles
Dialog Dialogue
hapa steps
ndërtim besimi confidence-building
simbolike symbolic
fuqi effect
çtensionim de-escalation
stimuj incentives
fuqi ndikuese leverage
ndikim influence
paanshmëri impartiality
baraslargësi equidistance
balancim diplomatik balancing act
tregti commerce
investim investment
përfitim ekonomik dividend
pengesa administrative friction
zgjidhje praktike arrangements
funksionalitet functionality
rregullime institucionale arrangements
kuadër ligjor framework
çrregullim social dislocation
prova evidence
masë për ndërtimin e besimit confidence-building measure
dislokim deployment
pasoja të jashtme externalities
cenueshmëri vulnerability
ngërç stalemate
rezultate konkrete deliverables
llogaridhënie e ndërsjellë reciprocal accountability
vrull momentum
themel foundation
plan blueprint
garanci guarantees
kompromis compromise
pikë kthese turning point
